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Abstract
The problem of motion in general relativity is about how exactly
the gravitational field equations, the Einstein equations, are related
to the equations of motion of material bodies subject to gravitational
fields. This paper compares two approaches to derive the geodesic mo-
tion of (test) matter from the field equations: ‘the T approach’ and
‘the vacuum approach’. The latter approach has been dismissed by
philosophers of physics because it apparently represents material bod-
ies by singularities. I shall argue that a careful interpretation of the
approach shows that it does not depend on introducing singularities
at all, and that it holds at least as much promise as the T approach. I
conclude with some general lessons about careful vs. literal interpre-
tations of scientific theories.
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1 Introduction
It is a bit of an irony that one of the most widely embraced definitions of
what it means to be a scientific realist is due to the arch-anti-realist Bas van
Fraassen. His definition starts by stating that “Science aims to give us, in its
theories, a literally true story of what the world is like”.1 And indeed, scien-
tific realists often see themselves as committed to ‘taking scientific theories at
face value’: if the best theories of particle physics say that quarks exist, then
we should believe that they exist; if general relativity tells us that gravity
is really just an aspect of spacetime structure, then we should believe it; if
quantum mechanics tells us that the world is at its core non-deterministic,
then we should believe that too.
The problem is that scientific theories, or at least the theories of modern
physics, are not that straightforward with us. They may seem so at first,
but if you listen to the details of their respective stories, if you take your
time to look under the surface, what exactly we should take them to tell
us about the world is far from clear. Murray Gell-Mann, the inventor of
the concept of quarks, for a long time did not think that quarks should
be interpreted as literally existing; neither did Richard Feynman. Albert
Einstein passionately resisted the interpretation of general relativity that says
that the gravitational force field of Newtonian theory is ontologically reduced
to the geometry of spacetime in general relativity. And of course, there is
a long-standing battle in foundations of physics about whether quantum
mechanics really does tell us that the world is non-deterministic.2
In this paper I shall introduce a new case study that provides further
evidence for the position that, whether you are a realist or not, the literal
interpretation of a scientific theory, especially in physics, can be rather mis-
leading. I will argue that what we should aim for is a careful interpretation;
1Van Fraassen [1980], p.8.
2For a discussion of different interpretations of the quark concept see Pickering [1999],
for Einstein’s opposition to interpreting general relativity as a geometrization of gravity see
Lehmkuhl [2014], and for debate on whether quantum mechanics is really indeterministic
see e.g. Saunders et al. [2010].
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an interpretation of the theory or model or formalism that engages with its
details, both with the details of its mathematical structure and with how it
is applied to the natural world. Philosophy of science must be willing to look
under the hood.
The case study I want to look at is the so-called problem of motion in
the general theory of relativity (GR). It asks about the precise relationship
between the two sets of equations that are at the very heart of GR. On the
one hand there are the Einstein field equations, which give us the dynamics
of the gravitational potential (the metric tensor) gµν :
Rµν − 1
2
gµν = κETµν . (1)
On the other hand, we have the geodesic equation that determines which
paths through spacetime are geodesics of the connection Γνµσ compatible
with the metric gµν :
d2xτ
ds2
+ Γτµν
dxµ
ds
dxν
ds
= 0. (2)
In GR, material bodies subject only to gravitational fields are supposed to
move on the geodesics determined by equation (2).3 The problem of motion
in GR is the question of whether the equations of motion of matter subject to
gravitational fields (2) can be derived from the gravitational field equations
(1).
Einstein himself, in his first publication on the topic, a paper co-written
with Jakob Grommer and published in 1927, compares different classes of
attempts to give such a derivation. In particular, Einstein and Grommer
distinguish between two classes of attempts at deriving the geodesic motion
of matter from the gravitational field equations, which I will term the T
approach and the vacuum approach, respectively. The T approach starts from
the realization that the field equations (1) imply the conservation condition,
namely that the covariant divergence of the energy-momentum tensor Tµν
vanishes:
∇µTµν = 0 . (3)
3It is a big question which systems are actually included under ‘material bodies’ here.
The minimal position is that only test particles are referred to: particles with negligible
extension, spin, and self-gravity. However, many actual bodies can be approximated well
by test particles in this sense; planets orbiting a star are an example, as we shall see below.
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From this, together with certain conditions on the energy-momentum
tensor Tµν , the T approach derives that material particles move on time-
like geodesics. It is this kind of approach to the problem of motion that
philosophers have engaged with almost exclusively up to now.4
Einstein and Grommer end up dismissing the T approach, and suggest an
alternative path to deriving geodesic motion instead. It is a particular version
of a vacuum approach to the problem of motion. Einstein and Grommer start
from the vacuum form of the Einstein field equations,
Rµν = 0 , (4)
and attempt to derive that the equations (4) imply that material particles
move on geodesics.
To the extent that philosophers have engaged with this approach at all,
they have quickly dismissed it because it seems to model material bodies
by singularities in spacetime; while singularities, by definition, are not even
part of spacetime. However, in this paper I shall argue that this dismissal
was far too fast, and that indeed the vacuum approach deserves at least as
much attention by philosophers as the T approach. The vacuum approach,
despite first appearances, engages more closely with some of the most major
predictions of GR: both the prediction of the perihelion of Mercury and
the prediction of light bending by the Sun utilise the vacuum approach to
the derivation of motion of material systems. Indeed, even the prediction
of gravitational waves resulting from a binary black hole merger that was
recently confirmed rests on the vacuum field equations, for black holes are
described by vacuum solutions.5
My argument in this paper will proceed in three steps. First, I will argue
that the vacuum approach to the problem of motion promises certain ad-
vantages that the T approach lacks. Second, I will argue that the problems
of the vacuum approach for which it has been dismissed are artefacts of a
too literal interpretation of the formalism and its application to the problem
at hand. Third, I will argue that a careful interpretation makes the prob-
lems disappear; I will argue that the approach does not need to interpret
singularities as representing material bodies.
4For a comprehensive review of the early history of this approach see Havas [1989]
and Kennefick [2005]; for two particularly beautiful exemplars from within this class of
proofs see Geroch and Jang [1975] and Ehlers and Geroch [2004], which are investigated
by Brown [2007], Malament [2012], and Weatherall [Forthcoming, 2011].
5See Abbott et al. [2016] and references therein.
4
2 A critical comparison of the two research
programmes
I said above that the T approach to the problem of motion proceeds via
the fact that the Einstein field equations (1) imply the conservation con-
dition (3), which in turn implies the geodesic motion of matter. However,
as Malament [2012] pointed out, the conservation condition by itself is not
sufficient to prove that the geodesic equation is the equation of motion of ma-
terial particles. One of the most general proofs from within the T approach,
proposed by Geroch and Jang [1975] and further generalised by Ehlers and
Geroch [2004], rests not only on the conservation condition (3), but also on
the strengthened dominant energy condition, which states:
Given any timelike covector ξµ at any point in M , T
µνξµξν ≥ 0
and either T µν = 0 or T µνξµ is timelike.
The first clause is effectively the weak energy condition, which states that
the mass-energy-momentum density associated with the body in question is
always non-negative. The second clause states that every observer will judge
the mass-energy-momentum of the body to propagate along time-like curves
only.6
It would be rather attractive if we did not have to presume that mate-
rial particles move on time-like curves to then show that these curves are
actually time-like geodesics, and if we did not have to presume that matter
cannot have non-negative mass-energy. These are weak assumptions about
the nature of matter, but they are assumptions.
The vacuum approach to the problem of motion, on the other hand, aims
to make no assumptions about the nature of matter and its properties at all,
and to still derive that matter moves on geodesics. It starts from the question
of whether just knowing the exterior gravitational field of a material body,
and how this gravitational field interacts with the gravitational field of its
surroundings, is enough to derive that the body will move on a geodesic of the
metric surrounding it. Arguably, this programme is far more ambitious than
the T approach, for it starts with fewer assumptions.7 And yet, if successful,
it would really fit much better the virtues that philosophers have associated
6For more on the interpretation of the strengthened dominant energy condition
seeWeatherall [2011], Weatherall [Forthcoming] and especially Curiel [Forthcoming].
7One might be tempted to argue that despite first appearances the vacuum approach
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with the geodesic theorem(s) in the first place: deriving the inertial motion
of matter from knowledge of the dynamics of gravitational fields alone.8
Einstein was deeply skeptical of the role of the energy-momentum ten-
sor in GR. Throughout the decades, he emphasised that Tµν provides only
a ‘phenomenological representation of matter’.9 In Einstein and Grommer
[1927], Einstein elaborates that general relativity with an energy-momentum
tensor as a source term on the right-hand side of (1) is just not a com-
plete theory: it does not tell us what kind of matter is present, only that
it has a certain mass-energy distribution. This perspective on GR was fur-
ther strengthened by Tupper [1981, 1982, 1983], who showed that knowing
the energy-momentum tensor of a material system does not suffice to tell
us what kind of matter is present. For example, one and the same mass-
energy-momentum distribution Tµν featuring on the right-hand side of the
Einstein equations, and solving the Einstein equations for the same metric,
can correspond either to an electromagnetic field or a viscous fluid. Knowing
the energy-momentum tensor is just not sufficient to know which of these
two material systems it is that interacts with the metric field.
Einstein’s aim is then to instead start with the vacuum field equations
starts with more demanding assumptions than the T approach. For the vacuum Einstein
equations (4) logically imply that the strengthened dominant energy condition (SDEC)
holds for the Ricci tensor Rµν . The opposite is not true, so that demanding Ricci flatness is
clearly a stronger constraint on the Ricci tensor than demanding that it obeys the SDEC.
But concluding from this that the vacuum approach starts from stronger assumptions than
the T approach would be a mistake. For the T approach assumes i.) the full Einstein field
equations (1); and ii.) that the energy-momentum tensor (and thus the Einstein tensor)
adheres to the SDEC. The vacuum approach only assumes the vacuum Einstein equations
(4), and thus starts with weaker assumptions than the T approach. However, it might
well be that depsite starting with weaker assumptions than the T approach, a particular
manifestation of the vacuum approach might end up with stronger assumptions than
a particular manifestation of the T approach. For example, the 1927 Einstein-Grommer
vacuum approach, discussed below, involves, among other demands, a so-called equilibrium
condition which is supposed to relate solutions to the non-linear field equations to solutions
of the linearized field equations in a particular way; no such demand is included in, say,
the Geroch-Jang version of the T approach. Thus, further analysis might well show that
Einstein and Grommer use stronger assumptions than Geroch and Jang. Einstein himself
would likely have been content with that, as long as it allowed him to avoid the introduction
of Tµν , for reasons discussed below.
8Cf. Brown [2007], p. 141 and 163.
9See, for example, Einstein [1922], Einstein to Michele Besso, 11 August 1926 (EA-7-
361), and Einstein [1936].
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(4), treat material particles as singularities in the metric field,10 and derive
that they move on geodesics of a metric gµν that solves the vacuum field
equations (4) in the region through which the particle moves.
To the extent that philosophers have engaged with this approach at all,
they have already dismissed it at this point. The main criticism is that
the very idea of the approach is flawed: A singularity is not even part of
spacetime. How should it be possible to describe its motion in said spacetime?
Both Torretti and Earman essentially answer that this is not possible and
that the whole programme is ill-conceived. Earman [1995], p. 12, writes:11
[S]ingularities in the spacetime metric cannot be regarded as tak-
ing place at points of the spacetime manifold M. Thus, to speak
of singularities in gµν as geodesics of the spacetime is to speak in
oxymorons.
The most detailed discussion of the Einstein-Grommer paper in the philo-
sophical literature is due to Tamir [2012]. After quoting the above statement
by Earman, Tamir goes on to write (p.142):
The proponent of such a “vacuum-cum-singularity” technique is
faced with the rather paradoxical challenge of explaining in what
sense we can say that a singular curve (ostensibly constituted
by the missing points in the manifold) is actually a geodesic of
the spacetime from which it is absent. Not only is no metric
defined at the singularity, but also technically there are not even
spacetime points there: the geodesic does not exist.
Tamir then mentions a key ingredient of the Einstein-Grommer approach,
namely the distinction between an ‘inner metric’ and an ‘outer metric’.12
Einstein and Grommer aim to show that the particle characterized by a
10In recent years, the adequate definition of a singularity in GR has been a subject of
extensive debate, see e.g. Earman [1995] and Curiel [1999]. For Einstein’s thoughts on
singularities see Earman and Eisenstaedt [1999]; in the context of the Einstein-Grommer
paper Einstein clearly thinks of a singularity in the metric field gµν as a region where the
components of the metric tend to infinity.
11For similar statements see Torretti [1996], section 5.8.
12There is an interesting relationship between Einstein and Grommer’s distinction be-
tween inner and outer metric (discussed further in section 3) on the one hand and the later
distinction between interior and exterior black hole solutions on the other. I do believe
that bringing together results and concepts developed in the context of black hole solu-
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singular inner metric moves on geodesics of the non-singular outer metric.
Tamir states that the “suggested implication” is that we are to compare
a second spacetime whose metric is that of the regular outer metric with
the singular first spacetime, and identify the regular geodesic of the second
spacetime with the singular curve of the first one. He then argues that the
thought that the second singularity-free spacetime can teach us anything
about the singular original spacetime is “spurious”.
My point in the following will be this. Even if this argument were con-
vincing, its premise (the ‘suggested implication’ that Einstein and Grommer
intended to deduce something about a singular spacetime by comparing it
to a non-singular spacetime) is not. I shall argue that by looking at the de-
tails of the Einstein-Grommer approach we come to a different interpretation
of the approach, one that sheds a completely different light on the alleged
presence of singularities. We will see that a careful (rather than literal) in-
terpretation of the vacuum approach, and the Einstein-Grommer paper in
particular, does not actually depend on introducing singularities at all.
3 The vacuum approach to the problem of
motion
3.1 Two ways of looking at Einstein’s model of the
Sun-Mercury system
In a way, the story of the vacuum approach to the problem of motion starts
in 1915, with Einstein’s treatment of the orbit of Mercury around the Sun
in the context of GR. It is a two-body problem: a small body (Mercury)
with a comparatively small mass orbits a large body (the Sun). Einstein
seems to postulate (more on the ‘seems’ below) that the Sun be represented
by what would soon be recognized as an approximation to the Schwarzschild
metric. He definitely postulates (!) that Mercury moves on a geodesic of said
metric.13 In a way, the problem of motion in GR is about the question of
tions (a special case of vacuum solutions) on the one hand and the vacuum approach to the
problem of motion on the other hand is very promising indeed. I will have to postpone a
detailed discussion to a later paper; it will include the problem of motion of a binary black
hole, the black hole equivalent of the Sun-Mercury two-body system discussed below.
13For a careful analysis of Einstein’s Mercury paper and how it rests on the Einstein-
Besso manuscript see Earman and Janssen [1993], and Janssen’s Editorial Note on the
8
whether this second postulate is really necessary.
If we now look at Einstein’s Mercury paper and recall the kind of criticism
that was launched against the vacuum approach to the problem of motion,
we may find ourselves feeling puzzled. After all, the Schwarzschild metric is a
solution to the vacuum field equations, and it has a singularity at its center.14
If representing material bodies by singular metrics is so problematic, how
does it come about that Einstein [1915] successfully predicted the perihelion
motion of Mercury? Why is it not problematic to represent the Sun by the
singular Schwarzschild metric?
The answer lies in denying the premise of the question. Einstein’s treat-
ment of the Sun-Mercury system should not be interpreted as involving him
representing the Sun by (an approximation of) the Schwarzschild metric. We
know that the Sun is a material body with non-vanishing mass-energy, and
that it does not have a spacetime singularity at its center. What Einstein
really does is to convert the two-body problem Sun-Mercury into a one-body
problem, where one body (Mercury) is subject to an external gravitational
field. It is the exterior gravitational field of the Sun, not the Sun itself, that
is represented by the Schwarzschild metric. And that is enough to predict
the perihelion of Mercury: we don’t need to know what the Sun is made of
or what happens in its interior; all that matters is the exterior gravitational
field that Mercury is subject to.
Thus, worrying about the singularity at the center of the Schwarzschild
metric just misses the point: we do not have to interpret the interior part of
the Schwarzschild metric literally, at least not in this application.
In the following I shall argue that we should interpret the appearance of
singularities in the Einstein-Grommer vacuum approach to the problem of
motion in a similar vein.
3.2 The Einstein-Grommer vacuum approach to the
problem of motion
The general scheme of the Einstein-Grommer approach proceeds as follows.15
Einstein-Besso manuscript in Vol. 4 of the Collected Papers of Albert Einstein (CPAE).
14For the history and interpretation of the Schwarzschild metric and its analytic exten-
sions see Eisenstaedt [1989] and Bonnor [1992].
15The genesis of the Einstein-Grommer approach has been a bit of a mystery up to now,
as pointed out by Kennefick [2005]. However, the work on the 15th volume of Einstein’s
collected papers has revealed the context and correspondence leading up to that paper,
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1. Reformulate the vacuum Einstein equations in terms of a surface in-
tegral over a three-dimensional hyper-surface such that we can ask
whether gravitational energy-momentum represented by the pseudo-
tensor tτα passes through the surface.
16
2. Pick a curve that is supposed to represent the path of a material par-
ticle.
3. Impose the linear approximation according to which gµν = ηµν + γµν ,
i.e. assume that, at least close to the curve, the metric deviates from
Minkowski spacetime only slightly.
4. Realise that not all solutions to the linearized field equations will corre-
spond to solutions of the non-linear field equations that the linearized
field equations approximate. Argue that in the case where an ‘equilib-
rium condition’ for the energy-pseudo-tensor of the gravitational field
holds, the γµν of the linearized field equations will solve the full non-
linear equations reformulated as a surface integral.17
5. Now split the γµν in the immediate neighborhood of the particle into
the ‘inner metric γ¯µν that the particle itself gives rise to and the ‘outer
metric γ¯µν that is due to other sources (or lack thereof). Observe that
the ‘outer metric’ is entirely regular, even if extended to the point at
which the material particle is supposed to be located.
6. Integrate the surface integral that is equivalent to the vacuum field
equations ‘around’ the curve that is supposed to represent the path
of a material particle. For the case where the integration surface is a
sphere, the equilibrium condition for tτα simplifies to
∂γ¯44
∂xσ
= 0.
and how it fits into Einstein’s overall research program. It is a fascinating story; alas, it
will have to wait for a separate paper.
16There has been a long debate on whether gravitational energy can be adequately
represented by a pseudo-tensor; I will not be able to do it justice here. For some details
see the introduction to Volume 8 CPAE for the debate between Einstein, Klein, Levi-Civita
and Lorentz, for conceptual analysis Hoefer [2000] and especially Trautmann [1962].
17This step is very intricate and it would take me a few pages to do it justice. This point
of the Einstein-Grommer paper has not been adressed by the literature at all (neither in
physics nor in philosophy); I will argue elsewhere that it sheds new light on Einstein’s
later doubts as to whether the gravitational wave solutions of the linearized equations
correspond to gravitational wave solutions in the full non-linear theory.
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7. Conclude that the curve that represents the path of a material particle
is a geodesic of the outer metric γ¯µν .
18
4 Interpreting the Einstein-Grommer approach
to the problem of motion
The reader might think that the argument presented in the last section cannot
be a faithful representation of the Einstein-Grommer approach; after all,
where is the claim that the material particle is represented by a singularity,
the reason the approach was dismissed by Earman and Tamir? Indeed, I
have omitted that after step 5 of the argument Einstein and Grommer do
say that one could assume that the inner metric γ¯µν is given by what is
effectively a three-dimensional counterpart of the Schwarzschild metric: it is
spherically symmetric and has a singularity at the center. And yet, Einstein
and Grommer never use this assumption in their argument. They call the
material particle ‘the singularity’ all the time, but their argument does not
depend on assuming any particular form for the inner metric, let alone one
that is necessarily singular. As a matter of fact, they do not even mention a
concrete candidate metric for the outer metric γ¯µν ; all they need is that γµν
is split into the inner metric γ¯µν and the outer metric γ¯µν in such a way that
γ¯µν is non-singular everywhere.
Note that this does not mean that we know that the inner metric γ¯µν
is non-singular. We don’t know anything about the inner metric, for the
argument is independent of γ¯µν having any particular form, just like the
derivation of Mercury’s perihelion was independent of whether there is a
singularity at the center of the Schwarzschild metric that represented the
exterior field of the Sun.
With regard to the Sun-Mercury system I argued that we should not
interpret the Schwarzschild metric as representing the Sun, but as represent-
ing its exterior gravitational field. The part of the Sun that is within the
event horizon, including the singularity at the center, should not be taken
18Einstein and Grommer then go on to generalise this result to the ‘non-stationary case’,
i.e. the case where it is not demanded that the external gravitational field, to which the
particle is subject to, does not change in time. They conclude that in this case, too, the
particle will move on a geodesic of the outer metric γ¯µν that is a solution to the field
equations. For the following this generalisation does not make a difference; I will thus
refer only to the stationary scenario described above.
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as a representation of the actual interior of the Sun, but as a placeholder
or a blind spot within the current description of the Sun-Mercury system: a
docking station for a theoretical model of the Sun not included in Einstein’s
Sun-Mercury model.19
Likewise, we should interpret the inner metric γ¯µν in the Einstein-Grommer
approach as a placeholder for a representation of matter not included in the
current theoretical approach. Sure, you can set γ¯µν to be a Schwarzschild-like
metric with a singularity at the center. But you don’t have to do that to
make the Einstein-Grommer argument work, and even if you do make that
assumption, you should still take this particular inner metric with a singu-
larity at its center as a placeholder for a representation or theory of matter
not yet provided.20
But now wait a minute. You might have disliked the occurence of sin-
gularities as representations of particles, but at least the singularity (in lieu
of a non-vanishing energy-momentum tensor) gave you an idea of where in
spacetime the particle was supposed to be. True, Earman and Tamir rightly
pointed out that the singularity is not actually part of spacetime, and so it
can hardly serve to localize the particle in spacetime. Still, you might think
that we’re throwing the baby out with the bath water by not choosing any
inner metric. After all, is it not the case then that the curve we have been
focusing on is just any curve, without any reason to think of this curve as
the curve of a material particle?21
Again, I think we can counter this criticism by comparing the Einstein-
Grommer approach to Einstein’s treatment of the Sun-Mercury system in
19Note that there are interior extensions of the Schwarzschild metric that model the
interior of the Sun by solutions of the non-vacuum field equations (1), for example by an
incompressible perfect fluid. See Bonnor [1992], section 5.
20If I had given more historical details, I could have, I believe, shown that Einstein
himself saw the occurence of a singularity in the inner metric in exactly this way. This
exegetical argument would have started with evidence that, from early on, he saw GR as a
theory of the pure gravitational field without any constraints on what kinds of matter give
rise to the gravitational field. Furthermore, I would have argued that even in the Einstein-
Grommer paper he clearly forbids singularities outside of material particles (where the
theory is supposed to give an adequate and deterministic representation of gravitational
fields) but has no problem with them appearing inside of material systems, where the
theory can provide at best phenomenological placeholders for a future ‘proper’ theory of
matter anyhow. Thus, for Einstein energy-momentum tensors as alleged representatives
of material systems were on a par with singularities: both were only placeholders for a
proper theory of matter.
21I thank Jim Weatherall for putting this question to me.
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Einstein [1915]. What Einstein did there was to assume that Mercury would
move on some geodesic of the exterior gravitational field produced by the
Sun. He calculated an approximation to the external gravitational field of a
static, spherically symmetric and asymptotically flat body; this gravitational
field he saw as represented by the connection components Γνµσ of a metric
gµν which deviated only slightly from the flat Minkowski metric. He then
inserted these gravitational field components Γνµσ into the geodesic equation
(2). He showed that this law contained Newton’s first law and Newton’s
second law with a gravitational potential giving rise to a force as a limiting
case, and showed how the resulting Keplerian laws for orbits differ in his
theory as compared to its Newtonian limit. In the end, he obtained that
according to the new theory the perihelion  of any geodesic orbit around
the Sun is given by
 = 24pi3
a2
T 2c2(1− e2) (5)
Here a denotes the length of the semimajor axis of the orbit in question, e
its eccentricity, c the speed of light, and T the orbital period of the planet in
question. Einstein then takes the astronomically known values for Mercury,
plugs them into equation (5), and thereby predicts that Mercury’s perihelion
changes by 43” per century.
Note that there is nothing in the theoretical description that singles out
any particular path as that of Mercury. There is no theoretical representation
of Mercury, no model. All that is there is the assumption that Mercury will
move on one of the geodesics of the affine connection determined by the
spherically symmetric field of the Sun. A general equation that all possible
geodesic orbits have to fulfil is derived. And then external knowledge is used
to single out one of these orbits as that of Mercury. Einstein trusts that
the astronomers have measured the orbital period, the semimajor axis and
the eccentricity of Mercury correctly. It is this external knowledge, plugged
into his theoretical model, which does not in itself contain a representation
of Mercury or its path, that produces the prediction.
In many ways, the whole vacuum approach to the problem of motion
is about the question as to whether in this kind of scenario we really have
to assume the geodesic equation as the equation of motion of matter over
and above the gravitational field equations. Indeed, let us look at the Sun-
Mercury system within the 1927 Einstein-Grommer approach. The problem
of motion, then, is the question whether Einstein really had to introduce the
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gravitational field equations (to describe the exterior gravitational field of
the Sun) and the geodesic equation (to describe the path of Mercury subject
to this gravitational field) as separate assumptions.22 Could he have only
assumed the gravitational field equations and derived that Mercury moves
on a geodesic of the exterior field of the Sun? My point is that, just like
in Einstein’s 1915 treatment, the 1927 Einstein-Grommer approach does not
need to commit to a theoretical model that allows us to localise Mercury
internally. It is fine to ask whether the exterior gravitational field around
a given curve ‘forces’ that curve to be a geodesic. Just like in the 1915
treatment, Einstein and Grommer could then use external knowledge about
whether that particular curve is actually the curve of a material object, or
of Mercury in particular. No inner metric, no singularity to represent the
material body, is actually needed.
Let us take a step back though, for there is an important difference be-
tween the structure of Einstein’s 1915 treatment of Mercury on the one hand
and the 1927 Einstein-Grommer approach on the other. In the Mercury case
Einstein had assumed (!) that Mercury moves on a geodesic, i.e. a special
kind of curve, and model-external knowledge about the period, eccentricity
and semimajor axis of Mercury could then be used to determine which of
the many geodesics of the Schwarzschild metric corresponded to the path
of Mercury. But in the case of the Einstein-Grommer argument, what is in
question is whether we can prove that the path of Mercury, say, is a geodesic.
Thus, at first sight it looks as if while the 1915 argument only needed ex-
ternal knowledge to determine which geodesic is that of Mercury, appeal to
external knowledge in the Einstein-Grommer case would have to determine
a.) that this curve is a geodesic and b.) that it is the curve of a material
body.
Einstein and Grommer did not aim to derive both a.) and b.). Instead,
while Einstein in 1915 used external knowledge at the end of his argument,
Einstein and Grommer in 1927 use it at the beginning. They start out by
assuming that a given curve is the curve of a material particle, and then
ask whether having a regular outer metric (which solves the vacuum field
equations) around the curve means that the curve of this material particle,
22Interestingly, Einstein did not yet have the final gravitational field equations in the
Mercury paper; he found them a week later, in his fourth paper of November 1915. How-
ever, the approximation of the Schwarzschild metric that he uses in the Mercury paper is
an approximative solution of both the field equations from the Mercury paper, and of the
final Einstein field equations.
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given the further conditions summarized in section 3.2, must be a geodesic.
Rather than finishing the argument by appeal to external knowledge (as
in Einstein 1915), the Einstein-Grommer argument starts with an appeal to
external knowledge, which singles out a particular curve as that of a material
body.23
Either way, both in Einstein’s 1915 treatment and in the Einstein-Grommer
approach there is no reason to interpret the singularity (appearing in the
Schwarzschild metric or the inner metric, respectively) literally. In both
cases, the singularity should be interpreted to signify a placeholder or a blind
spot of the theoretical treatment, rather than something that should be inter-
preted literally, as referring and approximately true. Indeed, both Einstein’s
1915 treatment of the Sun-Mercury system and Einstein’s and Grommer’s
treatment of an arbitrary material particle subject to an external gravita-
tional field work just as well if, in the former case, no interior metric (to
describe the interior of the Sun) or, in the latter case, no inner metric (to
represent the location of the particle on the curve), is ever specified.
5 Conclusion
I started out by saying that whether we are realists or antirealists, we should
aim for a careful interpretation, rather than a literal interpretation, of the
scientific theory that we want to be realists or anti-realists about. As a case
study, I argued that the vacuum approach to the problem of motion in GR,
and the Einstein-Grommer approach in particular, is far more sensible and
promising if we interpret the singularities not as representing material bodies
but as placeholders for a representation of material bodies that is not included
in the model. Indeed, I argued that the approach does not even need the
23There is a further disanalogy between Einstein’s 1915 derivation of the perihelion of
Mercury and the Einstein-Grommer argument of 1927. In the former the choice of (an
approximation) the Schwarzschild metric to represent the exterior gravitational field of
the Sun does important work in the derivation of Mercury’s perihelion. In the Einstein-
Grommer approach, no choice of a concrete outer metric is necessary to derive that the
curve of the particle which is surrounded by the outer metric must be a geodesic. The
reason for this difference is that the Einstein-Grommer approach aims to be more general;
it only aims to derive that a material body moves on some geodesic of the outer metric.
However, note that it is not the case that any outer metric is allowed by the approach:
the class of outer metrics that the approach can work with is heavily constrained by steps
2 and 3 of the Einstein-Grommer argument (see section 3.2).
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introduction of singularities to represent material bodies; their introduction
does not do any work in answering the question at hand.24
Given that in their paper Einstein and Grommer seem to take the singu-
larities as representing material bodies, one might wonder whether this al-
legedly more careful interpretation does not fall prey to the criticism that the
careful interpreter presumes to understand the theory/formalism in question
better than its originators. This might seem at odds with the realist tenet
of taking scientists and science ‘seriously’. I do indeed think that putting
the Einstein-Grommer paper into its proper historical context by analysing
Einstein’s correspondence leading up to the paper and by relating it to his
overarching research project at the time would convincingly show that he
subscribed to something very much like the ‘placeholder interpretation’ I de-
fended above. Showing this in detail will have to wait for a much longer
paper, and I do not ask the reader to just take my word for it. So let us say,
for the sake of the argument, that Einstein and Grommer did indeed intend
the singularities as representatives of material objects in a rather straight-
forward way. I believe that we should not take their word for it either. And
neither did Einstein. Just a few years after the Einstein-Grommer paper, in
his famed 1933 Spencer lectures at the University of Oxford, Einstein told
us in his opening words: “If you wish to learn from the theoretical physicist
anything about the methods which he uses, I would give you the following
advice: Don’t listen to his words, examine his achievements.”25
In philosophy of science, I believe there is no better way of examining a
scientist’s achievements than by looking for the best possible interpretation
24The argument that we should thus not see a realist as comitted to being a realist about
the singularities appearing in the Einstein-Grommer paper resonates well with selective
or posit realism as introduced by Vickers [2013]. The idea there is that we should only
be realists with respect to components of a prediction that ‘fuel the success’ of the pre-
diction, i.e. that are indispensable in the derivation of what is predicted. Using Vickers’
distinction the introduction of a singular inner metric in the Einstein-Grommer approach
is an idle rather than a working posit. However, note that the call for careful rather than
literal interpretations with which I started is independent of / complementary to aiming
for identification of the idle posits in a derivation. For even if we had found that the
introduction of the singular inner metric did do work in the derivation of geodesic mo-
tion could we have argued (with less force) that the singularity should be interpreted as
a placeholder for a future theory of matter, as a temporary measure within an effective
theory, and thus not as something that we should interpret as possesing as much ‘reality’
or ‘referring power’ as the regular outer metric governed by the field equations.
25See Einstein [1934], and van Dongen [2010] for a detailed analysis of the text.
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of his or her theories. To do that, we have to not just listen to the words
of the scientist who created or discovered it; we have to see what the theory
does in practice, how it is used ; which of its parts really do the work.
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